Recent studies have shown that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to various attacks, including evasion attacks and poisoning attacks. On the defense side, there have been intensive interests in provable robustness against evasion attacks.
Introduction
Building machine learning algorithms that are robust to adversarial attacks has been an emerging topic over the last decade. There are mainly two different types of adversarial attacks: (1) evasion attack, in which the attackers manipulate the test examples against a trained machine learning model, and (2) data poisoning attack, in which the attackers are allowed to perturb the training set. Both types of attacks have attracted intensive interests from academia as well as industries [1] [2] [3] [4] .
Several solutions to these threats have been proposed [5] [6] [7] [8] . For instance, adversarial training has been proposed to retrain the ML models with generated adversarial examples [9] ; quantization has been applied to either inputs or neural network weights to defend against potential adversarial instances [6] . However, recent studies have shown that these defenses are not resilient against intelligent adversaries responding dynamically to the deployed defenses [5] .
As a result, one recent, exciting line of research aims to develop the provably robust algorithms against evasion attacks. To provide provable robustness for ML models, one usually needs to solve a min-max problem min θ max π l f (x + π, y), where θ denotes the model parameter, π the perturbation and l f (·) the loss function for the training instance (x, y). Given the model complexity such as deep neural networks, exactly Figure 1 : In this paper, we define a robust training process RAB for classifiers. Given a poisoned dataset D -produced by adding backdoor patterns ∆ by the attacker to some instances in the clean dataset D -this process guarantees that, for all test examples x, A D (x) = A D (x), with high probability when the magnitude of ∆ is within the certification radius.
solving this min-max problem could be NP-complete. Therefore, in primal optimization different methods are developed to encode the nonlinear activation functions as linear constraints. For instance, NSVerify [10] , MIPVerify [11] , and ILP [12] are proposed. The constraints can also be simplified through dual optimization. Representative methods for dual optimization are Duality [13] , ConvDual [14] , and Certify [15] .
Despite these recent developments on the provable robustness against evasion attacks, only empirical studies have been conducted to defend against poisoning attacks [16, 17] , and the question of how to improve and certify the robustness bound of given machine learning models against advanced poisoning adversarial attacks remains largely unanswered. In particular, to our best knowledge, there are no provably robust strategies to deal with poisoning attacks. Naturally, we wonder: Can we develop provably robust algorithms for poisoning attacks?
Poisoning attack is a popular family of attacks in which an attacker adds small patterns to the training set such that the trained model is biased towards test images with the same pattern. Such attacks can be applied to various real-world scenarios such as online recommendation systems [18] . In this paper, we present the first certification process for provable robustness against backdoor attacks, which is the most popular poisoning attack against DNNs. Specifically, we focus on the following setting. Let A {xi,yi}n : X → {0, 1} be the classifier trained with an n-example training set {(x 1 , y 1 ), ..., (x n , y n )}. Let x be a test example, we focus on the certification process that guarantees the following properties: n i=1 π i 2 < R ⇒ A {xi,yi}n (x) = A {xi+πi,yi}n (x). Intuitively, this guarantees that the prediction of the classifier will stay consistently the same, no matter what patterns the attacker adds to the training set as long as these patterns are bounded by certain radius.
In this paper we first present a general provable robust framework that significantly generalizes over the recent result of randomized smoothing.
In our framework, we provide a certification process for (1) any deterministic function f with output domain in [0, 1] , with the special case as a base classifier; (2) any type of perturbation, parametrized by a parameter δ, on the input of f ; and (3) we provide sufficient conditions under which our general result provides a tight robustness bound. This framework allows us to naturally develop the first certification process against poisoning attacks.
Given its generality, we particularly propose the RAB robust training process to improve prediction robustness against backdoor attack which is the most popular poisoning attack against DNNs. In addition to the certified robustness bound against normal DNNs, we also evaluate the models with differentially private smoothing training process and show that such "smoothed" models enjoy higher certified robustness. This provides some guidance of improving the certified robustness against poisoning attacks and we hope it can inspire other robust learning works in the future. Besides DNN models, we also observed an interesting connection between RAB and a recently developed result from the database community [19] and adapt the technique to show that for simple models such as KNNs, it is possible to perform efficient exact smoothing robust training process instead of randomly sampling noise from a noise distribution. We propose a exact smoothing algorithm for 1NN models to certify its robustness against backdoor attacks.
We evaluate our algorithms on multiple machine learning models including DNNs, differentially private DNNs, and 1NN models, and provide the first collection of certified robustness bounds on a diverse range of datasets such as MNIST, CIFAR-10, ImageNet, and a spambase tabular data as benchmarks. We hope that these experiments and benchmarks can provide future directions for improving the model robustness.
As the first result on provable robustness against a poisoning attack, we have no doubt that these results will be improved by follow-up work in the near future. We make the code and evaluation protocol publicly available with the hope to facilitate future research by the community.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we made the following technical contributions.
• We propose a unified framework to certify model robustness against both evasion and poisoning attacks via promoting a general randomized smoothing strategy. We also prove the tightness for different smoothing strategies.
• We propose an exact efficient smoothing algorithm for 1NN models without needing to sample random noise during training.
• We provide the first certifiable robustness bound with theoretic guarantees against backdoor poisoning attacks on general machine learinng models with smoothing noise sampled from different distributions.
• We analyze the sufficient condition for model robustness against poisoning attacks. We show that smoother model (e.g. differentially private functions or models with certain dropout ratio) can achieve higher certified robustness.
• We conduct extensive reproducible large-scale experiments and provide a benchmark on the certified robustness against backdoor poisoning attacks for different machine learning models such as DNNs, differentially private DNNs, and 1NN on diverse datasets including ImageNet. We implement three different poisoning attacks during evaluation. We make our models and code publicly available at https://github.com/AI-secure/Robustness-Against-Backdoor-Attacks.
Background
We provide the overview for the state-of-the-art poisoning attacks especially backdoor attack (or Trojan attack), including different criteria to categorize them. We will then introduce the randomized smoothing strategy which has been used to improve the model robustness against evasion attacks.
Backdoor (poisoning) attacks
A backdoor attack on an ML model such as a neural network aims to inject certain "backdoor" patterns during training and associate such patterns with a specific adversarial target (label). As a result, during testing time, any test instance with such a pattern would be misrecognized as the pre-selected adversarial target [20, 21] . Such models with injected backdoors are called backdoored models or Trojan models which are usually able to achieve similar performance as benign models on normal test data, making it very challenging to identify such maliciously trained backdoored models. Different backdoor attacks have been developed to contaminate the machine learning training process. For instance, Gu et al. [20] demonstrate a "sticker" based backdoor attack for traffic signs against classifiers. It is shown that as long as the specific sticker pattern is added onto a stop sign, the backdoored model will always misrecognize it as a speed limit sign, while maintaining similar performance on other road signs.
There are several ways to categorize backdoor attacks. First, based on the adversarial target design, the attacks can be characterized as single target attack and all-to-all attack. In a single target attack, the backdoor pattern will cause the poisoned classifier to always return a designed target label, such as classifying any road sign with the backdoor pattern as a speed limit sign. An all-to-all attack leverages the backdoor pattern to permute the classifier results. For instance, Gu et al. demonstrate an attack where a backdoor pattern can cause the poisoned model to change the label of digit i to (i + 1) (mod 10) [20] .
Based on the difference in backdoor patterns, there are region based and blending backdoor attacks. In the region based attack, a specific region of the training instance is manipulated in a subtle way that will not cause human notification [3, 20] . In particular, it has been shown that such backdoor pattern can be as small as only one or four pixels [22] . On the other hand, Chen at al. [21] show that by blending the whole instance with certain pattern such as a meaningful background or a fixed random pattern, it is also possible to generate effective backdoor instances to poison the ML models. As a result, during test time, targeted incorrect prediction could be made by the model on test data with the blending backdoor pattern.
Given different targeted machine learning models, the backdoor attacks can either focus on a single model such as a neural network [20, 21] or a distributed ML system such as federated learning [23] .
In addition, based on whether the attacker can manipulate the training data or directly the weights of the models, the backdoor attack can also be classified as data backdoor [3, 20, 21] and model parameter backdoor attacks [24] [25] [26] . The data backdoor attack embeds specific backdoor patterns for training data, while the model parameter backdoor attack directly manipulates the model parameters. The model parameter backdoor attack contains three steps. First, the adversary generates a backdoor pattern using the gradient-based approach, which is the easiest way to backdoor attack a model; next, the adversary reverse-engineers some inputs from the model as training data; finally, the adversary adds the generated backdoor pattern to the synthesized input data and retrains a small part of the model. After retraining, the model will output the desired label for test data with the designed backdoor pattern. In this attack the adversary is only able to choose the backdoor mask which controls the shape and location of the backdoor, while the exact backdoor pattern generated by the gradient-based approach is not under the control of the adversary.
In this work, we mainly focus on certifying the robustness of a single model against general backdoor attacks, where the attacker is able to add either specific or uncontrollable random backdoor patterns. In particular, we will analyze both the region based and blending attacks.
Improving learning robustness via randomized smoothing
The randomized smoothing technique has been studied by several works to improve learning robustness. Some provide heuristic approaches to defend against adversarial examples [27, 28] , and some provide theoretic guarantees against the L p bounded adversarial perturbation. In particular, Cohen et al. [29] have proposed a tight robustness guarantee in L 2 norm with Gaussian noise smoothing.
On the higher level, the randomized smoothing strategy [29] provides a way to certify the robustness of a smoothed classifier against adversarial examples during test time. First, a smoothed classifier is obtained by sampling Gaussian noise ε ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) around each test instance. Then, the classification gap between a lower bound of the confidence on the top-1 class p A and an upper bound of the confidence on the top-2 class p B are obtained. The smoothed classifier will be guaranteed to provide consistent predictions within the perturbation radius, which is a function of the variance of smoothing noise σ, p A and p B , for each test instance.
However, all these approaches focus on the robustness against evasion attacks only, and in this work we aim to first provide a general smoothing functional to certify the robustness against both evasion and poisoning attacks. In particular, the current randomized smoothing strategy focuses on adding noise to smooth on the level of test instance, while our unified framework generalizes it to smooth on the level of classifiers. We then specifically describe the additional challenges of certifying robustness against poisoning backdoor attacks, and provide theoretic robustness guarantees for different machine learning models, randomized smoothing noise distributions, as well as the tightness of the robustness bounds.
Threat Model
We will first provide a detailed threat model analysis for poisoning attacks especially backdoor attack against general machine learning models including deep neural networks [18, 20] ; and then specify the threat model focused in this paper and emphasize its generality. Concretely, the threat model consists of definition of the adversary's goal, knowledge of the attacked system, and capability of manipulating or poisoning the training data, to eventually categorize the potential backdoor poisoning attack strategies.
Adversary's goal
The goal of an adversary is to inject "backdoors" during the machine learning model training phase, so that predictions on new data will be modified in the testing phase. There are potentially two types of poisoning attacks based on the adversary's goal: availability attack and integrity attack. If the adversary aims to affect prediction indiscriminately, i.e., to cause a denial of service, it is called availability attack [18] . On the other hand, if the adversary's goal is to cause specific mis-predictions during the test phase while preserving the predictions on the other test instances, it is referred to as integrity attack [20, 25] .
Adversary's knowledge
Given the information that an adversary can access, the poisoning attacks include white-box and black-box attacks. In the white-box attack scenario, the attacker is assumed to have knowledge about the training data D train and the learning algorithm L, as well as the model parameter θ. This way, it is possible for the attacker to synthesize the optimal poisoning instances to poison different machine learning models with low poisoning ratio [30, 31] . In the black-box attack, the attacker has no knowledge about the training data or ML models, while is able to collect and contribute additional training data [20] . This way, either the transferable poisoning attack or the model agnostic poisoning attack would be performed [32, 33] .
Adversary's capability
To conduct poisoning attacks, the adversary would inject poisoning instances into the training set before the model is trained. The attacker's capability is usually limited by the number of poisoning instances that can be injected and the manipulations added to each poisoning instance. Lower poisoning ratio would help to preserve the model performance on benign test data, and smaller manipulation for each poisoning instance would imply lower chance to be detected. In addition, the adversary can generate either fixed or dynamic backdoor patterns [34] to ensure the hardness of being detected.
General backdoor based poisoning attack. In this paper, based on Kerckhoffs's principle [35] we aim to certify the learning robustness against the strongest attacker, who aims to perform an integrity attack with white-box access to the learning model. In particular, we focus on the general backdoor based poisoning attack, where the attacker is able to inject a desired "backdoor" pattern to certain training instances. We allow the attacker to design different backdoor patterns with their chosen poisoning ratio, backdoor magnitude, location, position, and we also allow the attacker to generate different backdoors for different instances dynamically to ensure the robustness against a dynamic backdoor attack [34] . To our best knowledge, this is the first work to provide: (1) certifiable robustness against backdoor attacks, and (2) certifiable robustness against general backdoors including the dynamic [34] and uncontrollable backdoors (model parameter attack [24, 25] ).
We specifically analyze a range of backdoor patterns from small ones such as one pixel and four-pixel, and large ones which are based on the whole instance such as the "blending attack" [24, 25] .
Formal definition
We now provide the general notational setup and formally define the threat model analysed in this work.
Notation. We refer to X as the input feature space 1 , on which predictions of labels Y ⊆ N can be made. Furthermore, we write D n := n i=1 (X × Y) for the space of training sets D = {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x n , y n ))} comprised of n feature vectors x ∈ X and labels y ∈ Y generated according to some unknown distribution P X,Y . For a random variable X, we write P X to denote the probability measure induced by X and µ X for the probability mass function in the discrete case, or the probability density function, if X admits one, in the continuous case. For a set S we denote its probability by P X (S). Finally, we denote by S C the C-dimensional probability simplex S C = {p ∈ [0, 1] C | p 1 = 1} and define classifiers to be general deterministic functions h : X × D n → S C that output a vector of class probabilities, given a test instance x ∈ X and a training set D ∈ D n . We obtain the prediction by taking the label y ∈ Y which has the highest probability. The set of classifiers is written as H(X × D n , S C ).
Backdoor attack and defense. Given a training set of labelled training instances D, the learner's task is to learn a classifier h : X → Y to label test instances. The task of the adversary is to poison the training set by by replacing r training instances x i , y i by poisoned instances (x i + π i , y A i ) where y A i is the designed adversarial target. Given the poisoned training set, the defender will train a classifier h A . Here we allow that the set of r backdoors π j may be comprised of distinct patterns or just a single one. The goal of the adversary is that, during test time, given any test instance x test , h A (x test + π j ) = y A j where y A j represents the adversarial target which could be a single or an all-to-all attack as mentioned above. As a defender, the goal is to certify the learning robustness of a smoothed classifier g h given a base classifier h, such that during test time the smoothed classifier will always provide the same prediction for a test instance no matter what pattern is added to the training set: g h (x test + π|D) = g h (x test + π|D + π). We will show that the only condition that the patterns π j need to satisfy is that their L p -norm needs to be bounded, and this bound is a function of the classifier smoothing noise and the confidence gap between the top two classes for the smoothed classifier. We prove that our robustness bound is tight and we also show the different robustness performance of different types of classifiers including neural networks, differentially private neural networks which are additionally smoothed with privacy noise, and KNN classifiers.
Unified Framework for Certified Robustness
In this section we present the proposed unified theoretical framework for certified robustness for general machine learning models against either evasion or poisoning attacks, based on the randomized smoothing strategy, which has been leveraged to certify the robustness against evasion attacks [29] . We first define the basic notions of smoothing functionals, smoothed classifiers and the confidence of a classifier at a test instance and training set. Given these definitions, we present our main theoretical result and conditions under which this result provides a tight robustness guarantee.
Preliminaries
We view base classifiers as the entire prediction process that consists of learning the model given a dataset, and making a prediction at a test instance. The following definitions formalize the idea of smoothing such a base classifier by introducing noise to this prediction process. Specifically, we divide the smoothing process into two concepts: (1) the smoothing functional, which serves as the strategy governing the defense and allowing to model different attack scenarios, and (2) the ε-smoothed classifier which is given by the expectation over the noise distribution ε used to smooth the classifier.
Definition 1 (Smoothing Functional). We define a smoothing functional to be a general function
mapping base classifiers defined on X × D n to classifiers with input space X × D n × Z.
The above definition is of a rather general nature and only requires that F maps classifiers to classifiers. In essence, a smoothing functional acts on classifiers by introducing noise sampled from Z to the prediction process. We note that the resulting classifier F(h) does not yet have an explicit connection to the base classifier h. However, as we will see later, instantiations of this framework will establish a clear relation. The next definition integrates our notion of smoothing functionals with randomized smoothing classifiers.
Definition 2 (ε-Smoothed Classifier). Let F : H(X ×D n , S C ) → H(X ×D n ×Z, S C ) be a smoothing functional, h : X × D n → S C a base classifier and ε ∼ P ε a random variable taking values in Z. We define the associated ε-smoothed classifier as
The above Smoothing functional provides a general process for smoothing on the classifier level and, given a classifier, the Smoothing functional can be used to produce the ε-Smoothed Classifier based on general noise distributions. The next definitions establish a more explicit relation between the ε-smoothed classifier g ε h and the base classifier h for the cases where the smoothing functional transforms test instances (evasion attacks) and training datasets (poisoning attacks).
Definition 3 (Test Time Smoothing). We define smoothing functionals for evasion attacks F
where φ : X × Z → X is a deterministic function that acts on test instances x ∈ X with a transformation parameter z ∈ Z.
Definition 4 (Training Time Smoothing)
. We define smoothing functionals for dataset poisoning attacks F P : H(X × D n , S C ) → H(X × D n × Z, S C ) to be of the form
where ψ : D n × Z → X is a function that acts on datasets D ∈ D n with a transformation parameter z ∈ Z.
We see that these two types of smoothing strategies have different dynamics, allowing us to develop potential defenses against different types of threat models. The next type of smoothing functional unifies this and looks at smoothing as a simultaneous process during testing and training.
Definition 5 (Test and Training Smoothing). We define smoothing functionals for smoothing during test and training time F
where φ : X × Z → X and ψ : D n × Z → D n are deterministic functions.
We see that the choice ψ(D, z) = D amounts to test time smoothing, while φ(x, z) = x results in training time smoothing. The following definition of (p A , p B )-confidence at tuples of test instances and training sets (x, D) extends the notion of (p A , p B )-confidence at a test instance defined in [36] to our more general setting.
Definition 7 (Lower Level Sets). Let ε ∼ P ε , δ ∼ P δ be Z-valued random variables. For t ≥ 0, we define strict lower and lower level sets as
This Framework generalizes what is presented in [29] and [36] from input transformations to the more general notion of functionals that act on classifiers. This allows us to analyze and derive provable robustness against more general attack models.
For instance, consider the setting where an attacker adds a carefully chosen adversarial perturbation π 0 to a test instance x test with the goal of manipulating the prediction. A viable defense strategy would be to choose the input transform φ(x, z) = x + z and use Gaussian noise in combination with the smoothing functional F E , resulting in the ε-smoothed classifier g ε h (x| D) = E ε (h(x + ε| D)). With this instantiation of the proposed unified framework, we can recover the results presented in previous work [29] . In the next section, we provide a general robustness condition which allows us certify model robustness within this unified framework and in Section 5 we show how one can use this in order to obtain provable robustness against backdoor attacks.
A General Condition for Provable Robustness
We will now present our result for obtaining provable robustness. Our main Theorem 1 is a more general version of the robustness condition derived in [36] , and it allows us to analyze a substantially larger class of threat models. In particular, we extend the guarantee from test-time smoothing to smoothing functionals that act on classifiers, which allows us to obtain provable robustness against attacks on the entire prediction process (that includes learning and inference) rather than on a testing sample.
Our Theorem is based on the following intuition. Suppose that the ε-smoothed classifier g ε h predicts a test instance x test -given a training set D train -to be of class c A with probability at least p A and the second most likely class with probability smaller than p B . Theorem 1 tells us that under this assumption, if we were to use a different noise distribution δ for smoothing, then the δ-smoothed classifier g δ h is guaranteed to also predict x test to be of class c A given the same training set D train , as long as δ and ε satisfy a condition that depends only on the confidence levels p A and p B . We emphasize that no explicit relation between ε and δ is needed in order for the theorem to hold.
Let ζ : R ≥0 → [0, 1] be the function defined by
and define the function ξ :
If δ satisfies
While the generality of this statement allows to model a wide range of threat models, it bears the challenge of how one should instantiate this theorem such that it is applicable to defend against a specific adversarial attack. In addition to the flexibility with regards to the underlying threat model, we are also provided with flexibility with regards to the smoothing distributions, resulting in different robustness guarantees. This again comes with the question, which smoothing distributions result in useful robustness bounds. In the following, we will show how this theorem can be used to obtain provable robustness against dataset poisoning and in particular backdoor attacks. We refer the reader to Appendix C for a detailed proof of this result. The next proposition shows that ε and δ having non-disjoint support is a necessary condition on δ such that it can satisfy (12) . Proposition 1. If the support of δ is disjoint from the support of ε, then δ can not satisfy (12) .
The next theorem shows that our result is tight in the case where the function ζ satisfies certain regularity conditions. This result tells us that, whenever the distribution δ violates (12) and all we know about the smoothed classifier are its class probabilities, then there will always be a base classifier for which the corresponding δ-smoothed classifier makes the wrong prediction.
Let ε and δ be Z-valued random variables with non-disjoint support and such that ζ(0) = 0 and ζ is strictly increasing, continuous and
Consider the smoothing functional F T defined by
where φ : X × Z → X and ψ : D n × Z → D n are deterministic functions. Let x test ∈ X and D train ∈ D n . Then there exists a base classifier h * such that the ε-smoothed classifier
The following proposition shows that Gaussian smoothing provides a tight robustness bound.
with m δ = m ε and covariance matrix Σ. Then, condition (12) provides a tight robustness guarantee in the sense of Theorem 2.
As we will see in the next section, Gaussian smoothing results in an L 2 -robustness radius. In this case, Theorem 2 has the following -more intuitive -interpretation: assuming that we only know the class probabilities associated with a smoothed classifier, then it is impossible to certifiy a larger radius.
Certified Robustness Against Backdoor Poisoning Attacks
Theorem 1 is rather abstract and certifying robustness against backdoor attacks is not straightforward. In this section, we aim to answer the question: How can we instantiate this general result to obtain robustness guarantees against backdoor attacks? In addition -due to its generality -we can derive robustness bounds for smoothing with (1) isotropic Gaussian noise and (2) with uniform noise. These two distributions inhibit different dynamics and thus lead to distinct robustness bounds.
As a first step, we outline the intuition governing our approach to certifying robustness against backdoor attacks. Suppose that we are given a base classifier which was trained on a poisoned dataset that contains r inputs infected with the trojan pattern π 0 . Suppose we know that the smoothed (poisoned) classifier is confident in predicting a malicious input x test + π 0 to be of a given class y A . Our goal is to derive a condition on π 0 such that the prediction for x test + π 0 is the same as the prediction that a smoothed classifier would have made, had it been trained on a dataset that is not infected with the backdoor pattern π 0 . In other words, we obtain the guarantee that an attacker can not achieve their goal of systematically leading the test instance with the backdoor pattern to the adversarial target, meaning they will always obtain the same prediction as long as the added pattern π 0 satisfies certain conditions (bounded magnitude). The intention of the attackercarrying out a backdoor attack -has thus failed. The next corollary justifies this intuition and embeds it into our theoretical framework.
For the sequel, suppose that x test ∈ X is a test instance, D train ∈ D n a benign training set and π ∈ n i=1 R d is a set of n backdoors. Furthermore, let
denote the benign training set that contains flipped labels. The notation ⊕ C is used to denote addition modulo C.
Let ρ : Z → X be any deterministic function and let F T be the smoothing functional defined by
Let {Z i } n i=1 be a collection of n iid random variables, Z := (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) and consider the (π + Z)-smoothed classifier given by
Let π 0 ∈ R d be a backdoor pattern and suppose that g π+Z
for some c A ∈ Y. If condition (12) holds for the random variables ε := π + Z and δ := Z, then
The next two corollaries instantiate Corollary 1 with Gaussian and uniform noise distributions. For both cases, we get a robustness guarantee in L p -norm, telling us that, whenever the patterns π are within a given region, the smoothed classifier trained with the poisoned datasetD train + π will make the same prediction as the classifier trained with the benign datasetD train that contains flipped labels.
Corollary 2 (Gaussian Smoothing). Consider the setting in Corollary 1. Suppose that
then
In the special case where an attacker adds the same pattern π 0 to r training instances, then condition (24) reduces to 
Similar to the Gaussian case, if an attacker adds the same pattern π 0 to r training instances, then condition (27) reduces to
The next corollary shows that we can use uniform smoothing in order to obtain provable robustness with respect to the L ∞ -norm.
Consider the setting in Corollary 3. Let π 0 ∈ R d be a backdoor pattern and suppose that π contains π 0 exactly r times and the 0-vector n − r times. Then, condition (27) is satisfied, if π 0 satisfies
One crucial optimization to achieve better certified accuracy is to introduce the deterministic function ρ in the smoothing functional (20) . The intuition is as follows. When we smooth a classifier over the training process by perturbing the training set with small additive noise, then the base classifier has only seen perturbed examples. This can be problematic, when considering classification of clean images. For example, Gaussian noise places almost no mass near its mode in high dimensions. This results in training images that come from a distribution with virtually disjoint support from natural images and thus, such a model may fail to learn classifying clean samples. The (deterministic) function ρ thus provides us with a way to perturb test instances with noise and thereby increase model accuracy. One way to instantiate the smoothing functional is to simply define ρ to have a constant value ρ(Z) ≡ ρ 0 . Another possibility is to introduce noise by choosing an average over Z 1 , . . . , Z n . Finally, setting ρ(Z) to depend on the hash of the trained model also introduces randomness and can lead to better prediction accuracy.
Instantiating the General Framework with Specific ML Models
Based on the certified robustness against backdoor attacks by smoothing the training process, we show that theoretically it is possible to achieve robust prediction even though the training data is poisoned for general machine learning models. In this section, we will particularly analyze three types of machine learning models, including deep neural networks, differentially private deep neural networks, and simple models such as K-nearest neighbor classifiers (K=1). First, since the backdoor poisoning attacks have been shown most successful for deep neural networks which have caused a lot of attention, here we mainly want to evaluate and certify the robustness of different deep neural network models on diverse datasets. Secondly, we aim to understand more about the properties of models that could potentially lead to the learning robustness; 
Return: ABSTAIN. end if therefore we evaluate the certified robustness of differentially private models which are already "smoothed" on the given training data in order to minimize the sensitivity of learned models. Our hypothesis is that such smoothed model will achieve higher certified robustness against poisoning attacks based on our RAB certifiable training process. In addition, it is of great interest to know the robustness of other machine learning models, such as KNN models given the fact that these models have been widely applied in different applications either based on raw data or trained embeddings. Specifically, we are inspired by a recent result developed by the database community [19] and apply similar techniques to develop an efficient smoothing algorithms for KNN models (when K=1), such that we do not need to draw a large number of random samples from the smoothing distribution ε for these models.
Deep Neural Networks
Our pipeline of RAB on deep neural networks is shown in Alg. 1. Our goal is to calculate the prediction g π+Z h * as in Corollary 2 and the corresponding certified bound as in the right hand side of Eqn. 24. In the most intuitive way, we will first train N smoothed models h 1 , . . . , h N by sampling different smoothing noises Z to smooth the training dataset and train the models. Then, given the test data x test , the prediction of each model h k (x test ) is an unbiased estimation of g π+Z h * so we can use the averageg = 1 N h k (x test ) as the empirical estimation of g π+Z h * , and we will calculate the prediction c A and estimated probabilityp A andp B as shown in the algorithm. Finally, we use Hoeffding inequality to calculate the lower bound of p A and upper bound of p B with error tolerance α. In particular, by computing p A and p B according to
we can calculate the certified radius using these bounds. However, directly making predictions using h k (x test ) will not yield a good result in practice. The reason we find is that when the classifier h k is trained on a smoothed dataset {(x i + z i , y i )}, it usually has a better prediction performance on input data with noise (i.e. h k (x + z)) instead of directly on clean input data (i.e. h k (x)), since the model has only seen the data distribution x + z which could have different support with the data distribution x. As a result, we propose a simple yet effective heuristic to map the test instances to the nearby positions as well. We propose to add noise with the same distribution as z i 's during the test phase of the certification. However, in our theoretical analysis we require that the model is fully determined by the smoothed dataset and does not contain randomness. In order to achieve this, we change our training process so that our model h k now contains two parts -a trained model f k and a sampled noise u k ∼ N (0, σ 2 I).
In particular, we will first train f k using the smoothed dataset and then use the hash value of trained f k parameters as the random seed and sample u k ∼ N (0, σ 2 I). In practice we use SHA256 hashing [37] of the trained model file. The output of the model contains h k (x) = f k (x + u k ). This way, the h k is fully determined by the training dataset while in the meantime can get better prediction performance in practice.
Differentially Private Models
Based on the intuition that the "smoothed" model would be more robust against attacks, in this section we would like to provide a way to verify this assumption and further provide guidance about how to improve the certified robustness of machine learning models against poisoning attacks.
In the proposed RAB, we directly smooth the training process by adding different smoothing noise ε i at each time and then train a corresponding model as shown in Figure 2 . The jth trained model can be represented as
To estimate the effects of the model smoothness on the certified robustness bound, we improve the model training process with differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SDG) [38] . During each iteration of training the model f j , we would add certain noise to the gradient to reduce its dependency on specific training data and then clip the gradient to a predefined range. Intuitively, this process will add another level of "smoothness" to the model training and hopefully to obtain large gap between p A and p B and therefore provide higher certified robustness. Note that DP-SGD is just one way to provide a smoothed model training process and therefore improve model robustness. It is flexible to plug in any other smoothing strategies to the proposed RAB framework to enhance the learning robustness against poisoning backdoor attacks.
1-Nearest Neighbors
If the base classifier h is given by a 1-nearest neighbor classifier, we can evaluate the corresponding smoothed classifier analytically and thus compute the confidence levels p A and p B exactly, opposed to the approximation needed in the case for DNN classifiers. In this section, we show an example of how this computation can be performed efficiently for 1NN on Gaussian noise [19] .
In order to measure similarity between feature vectors x ∈ X , we use a quantized euclidean distance. Specifically, consider a partition of R ≥0 into L buckets
Associated with each bucket l is a level of similarity β l such that β 1 > β 2 > . . . > β L . We define the similarity associated with these quantization levels and buckets as
Given a test example x test and a training set D train ∈ D n , a 1-NN classifier returns the class of the training instance x i which is nearest to x test in terms of the similarity measure s L . Formally, let i (x test , D train ) denote the index of the training instance in D train most similar to x test , defined as i (x test , D train ) = arg min i=1,...,n s L (x i , x test ) and let y(i) = y i denote the class of a given training instance x i ∈ D train . 2 Then
for c ∈ Y. The next proposition gives a closed form solution for a 1NN classifier smoothed with Gaussian noise.
. . , n and let Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ). Consider the smoothing
where
and F d,λi denotes CDF of the non-central χ 2 -distribution with d degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter
. Algorithm 3 illustrates an efficient algorithm based on this result, which has a complexity of O(n · L).
Experimental Results
In this section, we aim to conduct extensive experiments to provide a benchmark for the certified robustness bound of different types of machine learning models on diverse datasets. In particular, we evaluate the DNNs, differentially private DNNs, and 1-NN on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet, and we consider three different types of backdoor patterns including one pixel, four pixel and blending attack. Furthermore, we also evaluate a tabular data spambase dataset on 1-NN model to assess the advantages of our efficient algorithm on 1-NN model. 
. */ q ← zeros(n) for i = 1, . . . , n do for l = 1, . . . , L do
end for end for return q
Experiment Setup
We provide the first benchmark on the certified robustness bound against backdoor attacks against different ML models on MNIST [39] , CIFAR-10 [40] and ImageNet [41] datasets. Following the backdoor attack setting as in [21, 22] , we train a DNN model to classify between the (source, target) label pair on each task and the attacker's goal is to inject a backdoor pattern during training so that a source input with the pattern will be classified as the adversarial target. We choose two pairs for each task -(0,1) and (8, 6) for MNIST, (airplane, bird) and (automobile, dog) for CIFAR, (dog, cat) and (dog, fish) for ImageNet. The training set sizes are 12665, 11769 on MNIST, 10000, 10000 on CIFAR and 20000, 10000 on ImageNet respectively. We use the architecture in [42] on MNIST and the architecture in [29] on CIFAR-10. For ImageNet, we use the standard ResNet-20 architecture.
We evaluate three representative backdoor patterns: add a specific pattern as one-pixel in the middle of the image, four-pixel, and blending a noise pattern to the entire image. The backdoor pattern is generated such that the perturbation norm for each pattern is bounded by the L 2 norm π 2 . For each attack, we will add r p backdoor training instances whose ground truth is the source class aiming to mislead the prediction of test instances with the pattern to the target label.
In order to estimate the bounds of p A and p B , we train N = 1000 smoothed models on MNIST and CIFAR,
return ABSTAIN end if and N = 200 smoothed models on ImageNet according to Algorithm 1. We then use Hoeffding's inequality to approximate the bounds with error rate α = 0.001. We use the smoothing parameters σ = 1.0, 2.0 on MNIST and σ = 0.5, 1.0 on CIFAR and ImageNet.
Besides the vanilla DNNs, we also use the differentially private training algorithm (DP-SGD) as proposed in [38] to further smooth a trained model on the instance level. We set the gradient clip norm to be C = 5.0, 100.0, 1000.0 and add Gaussian noise with scale σ = 4.0, 0.1, 0.01 for MNIST, CIFAR and ImageNet, respectively. In the KNN approach, we use N = 200 buckets.
As for the KNN models, we evaluate it with an additional spambase tabular dataset to demonstrate its effectiveness. In particular, we use the UCI Spambase dataset [43] which gives bag-of-word feature vector on a mail and determines whether the mail is spam or not. The dataset contains 4601 data cases with 57dimensional input. We use 80% of the data as training set to fit the KNN model and use the remaining 20% to evaluate. As for the backdoor attack, we will randomly add backdoor pattern as one (or four) dimension on the input, or a random pattern to the entire input vector similar with the blending attack.
We report our results with three metrics: prediction accuracy, certified rate and certified accuracy. Given the i-th test case with ground truth label y i , the output prediction is either c i within radius r i or c i = ABSTAIN at r i = 0. Given a test set of size m, the three evaluation metrics are calculated according to The prediction accuracy indicates how well the smoothed (backdoored) classifier performs in classifying new, possibly backdoored, instances without taking into account their robustness radius. The certified rate at r is given by the fraction of instances in the test set that can be cetrified at radius r i > r, indicating how consistent the attacked classifier is with a clean one. Finally the certified accuracy at r combines the first two metrics: it reports the fraction of the test set which is classified correctly (without abstaining) and is certified as robust with a radius r i > r. We evaluate the certified robustness bound on DNNs against different backdoor patterns, and we present the results for three evaluation metrics. Table 1 , 2 and 3 list the benchmark results on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, respectively. From the results, we can see that on MNIST, it is possible to obtain certified ACC around 99.6% as long as the L 2 norm of the backdoor patterns is within 0.5, and it will drop to around 70% with larger radius such as L 2 = 2. It is also obvious that during the RAB training, larger smoothing noise will help to achieve higher certified ACC and Cerfiried Rate. Similar observations can be drawn for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet as well, while the certified robustness on them is lower than on MNIST.
Certified robustness of DNNs against backdoor attacks

Certified robustness of differentially private DNNs against backdoor attacks
In addition to vanilla DNNs, we provide the certified robustness benchmarks on differentially private trained DNNs. Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the results on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. We can see that on MNIST the certified robustness on such smoothly trained models are much higher than that on vanilla DNNs, which provides further guidance on improving the robustness of ML models against backdoor attacks. On the other hand, the results on CIFAR-10 for the smoothed model is slightly lower than that on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet since the DPSGD is not able to train an effective model on these datasets. Further improvement on DPSGD would help to improve the certified robustness. 
Certified robustness of KNN models against backdoor attacks
In this section, we will present the benchmarks based on our proposed efficient algorithm on 1NN models. Tables 7 and 8 present results on MNIST and CIFAR-10, and Table 9 shows additional results on a tabular data (spam classification). From Table 8 we can see that the 1NN model achieves high Certified ACC and Certified Rate on tabular data, which indicates its effectiveness in specific domains. 
Related Work
In this section, we will discuss existing poisoning backdoor attacks on machine learning models, as well as existing defenses against such attacks.
Poisoning attacks
There have been several works developing optimal poisoning attacks against machine learning models such as SVM and logistic regression [18, 31] . Furthermore, [44] proposes a similar optimization based poisoning attack against neural network, that can only be applied to shallow MLP models. In addition to these optimization based poisoning attacks, the backdoor attacks are shown to be very effective against deep neural networks [21, 42] . The backdoor patterns could be either static or generated dynamically [4] . For static backdoor patterns, it could be as small as one pixel, or as large as an entire image [21] . The backdoor instances could be either generated with manipulated labels or clean labels [45] . In general, the poisoning ratio of these backdoor attacks does not need to be very high to mislead the DNNs, which renders such attacks very concerning for the widely applied DNN models.
Potential defenses against poisoning attacks
Given the potential severe consequences caused by backdoor attacks, multiple defense approaches have been proposed. Cleanse [16] proposes to detect the backdoored models based on the observation that there exists a "short path" to make an image of one label to be predicted as a malicious one. Therefore, it calculates the minimal amount of perturbation needed to cause all images to be predicted as each label, and uses anomaly detection approach to detect the perturbation which is much smaller in size than others. [46] improves upon the approach by using model inversion to obtain training data, and then apply GANs to generate the "short path" and apply anomaly detection algorithm as in Neural Cleanse. Activation Clustering [47] leverages the activation vectors from the backdoored model as feature to detect backdoor instances. It performs a two-class clustering over the activation vectors of the training data to separate benign data and backdoor instances. Spectral Signature [22] identifies the "spectral signature" in the activation vector of backdoored instances. It can calculate the spectral signature score for each data to remove the ones which possibly contain a backdoor based on the predefined threshold. STRIP [17] observes that for a backdoor instance, the model will mainly focus on the backdoor pattern. As a result, it proposes to identify the backdoor instances by checking whether the model will still provide a confident answer when it sees the backdoor pattern. SentiNet [48] leverages computer vision techniques to search for the parts in the image that contribute the most to the model output, which are very likely to be the backdoor pattern. It then copies each part to other images to check if it can constantly change the output of other images to identify the backdoors. Finally, another interesting application of randomized smoothing is presented in [49] . They use randomized smoothing to certify robustness against label-flipping attacks and randomize over the entire training procedure of the classifier by randomly flipping labels in the training set. This work is orthogonal to ours in that we investigate the robustness with respect to perturbations on the training inputs rather than labels.
Recently a short report also proposes to directly apply the randomized smoothing technique to potentially provide certified robustness against backdoor attacks without any evaluation or analysis [50] . In addition, as we have shown, directly applying randomized smoothing will not provide high certified robustness bounds. Contrary to that, in this paper, we first provide the unified framework with smoothing functional, and then propose the RAB robust training process to provide certified robustness against backdoor attacks. In particular, we provide the tightness analysis for the robustness bound, analyze different smoothing distributions, and propose the hash function based approach for mapping the test data so as to achieve good certified robustness. In addition, we analyze different machine learning models with corresponding properties such as model smoothness to provide guidance to further improve the certified robustness of machine learning models.
Conclusion
In this paper, we aim to propose a unified smoothing framework to certify model robustness against different adversarial attacks including both evasion and poisoning attacks. In particular, towards the popular backdoor poisoning attack, we propose the first robust training process as well as a test data mapping mechanism to certify the prediction robustness against diverse backdoor attacks such as backdoors with different static patterns and dynamic backdoor patterns. Based on the understanding for the robustness conditions, we propose to certify the robustness bound on vanilla DNNs, differentially private smoothed DNNs, and KNN models. We also propose an exact algorithm for KNN models without needing to randomly sample from the noise distributions. Here we provide comprehensive benchmarks of certified robustness against different machine learning models on diverse datasets. Different radius of the magnitude of backdoor patterns is also evaluated, which we believe will provide the first set of robustness bound against backdoor attacks for future work to compare with.
A Properties of ζ and ξ
In this section we show some properties related to the functions ζ and ξ defined in Section 4 of this paper.
Lemma A.1. ζ is right-continuous and non-decreasing.
Proof. Let t ≥ 0 and suppose that {t n } n∈N is a sequence such that t n ↓ t. In order to show right-continuity, we need to show that lim n→∞ ζ (t n ) = ζ(t). Let A n := {z : µ δ (z) /µε(z) ≤ t n } and note that P ε (A n ) = ζ(t n ). Since {t n } n is decreasing, we have A n+1 ⊆ A n . We claim that ∩ ∞ n=1 A n = S t . Suppose z ∈ ∩ ∞ n=1 A n . Then, ∀ n : µ δ (z) /µε(z) ≤ t n and thus µ δ (z) /µε(z) ≤ lim n→∞ t n = t, yielding z ∈ S t . If, on the other hand, z ∈ S t , then µ δ (z) /µε(z) ≤ t ≤ t n for all n and thus z ∈ ∩ ∞ n=1 A n . Finally, this yields
concluding the proof.
Proof. Since ζ is right-continuous, continuity follows if we show that ζ is also left-continuous. For that purpose, let t ≥ 0 and suppose that {t n } n∈N is a sequence such that t n ↑ t. Let A n := {z : µ δ (z) /µε(z) ≤ t n } and note that P ε (A n ) = ζ(t n ). Since {t n } n is increasing, we have A n ⊆ A n+1 . We claim that ∪ ∞ n=1 A n = S t . Suppose that z ∈ ∪ ∞ n=1 A n . Then, ∃ n such that µ δ (z) /µε(z) ≤ t n < t and hence z ∈ S t . If, on the other hand, z ∈ S t , then µ δ (z) /µε(z) < t. Hence, ∃ n such that µ δ (z) /µε(z) ≤ t n and thus z ∈ ∪ ∞ n=1 A n . Finally, this yields
The lemma follows from the assumption, since P ε (S t ) = P ε (S t ) = ζ(t).
Proof. The first inequality, follows since ζ is left continuous and thus P ε (S ζ −1 (p) ) = ζ(ζ −1 (p)) ≥ p. To show the second inequality, let t p := ζ −1 (p) and consider the sets A n := {z : µ δ (z) /µε(z) ≤ t p − 1 /n} and note that A n ⊆ A n+1 . We claim that ∪ ∞ n=1 A n = S tp . Suppose that z ∈ ∪ ∞ n=1 A n . Then, ∃ n such that µ δ (z) /µε(z) ≤ t p − 1 /n < t p and hence z ∈ S tp . If, on the other hand, z ∈ S tp , then µ δ (z) /µε(z) < t p . Hence, ∃ n such that µ δ (z) /µε(z) ≤ t p − 1 /n and thus z ∈ ∪ ∞ n=1 A n . This yields
Note that ∀ n : t p − 1 /n < t p = inf{t : ζ(t) ≥ p} and thus ζ(t p − 1 /n) ≤ p. Finally, together with (38) , this yields
Proof. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and t p := ζ −1 (p). Note that, since P ε (∂ t ) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, we have P ε (S tp ) = P ε (S tp ) = p. Thus S tp,p = S ⊆ Z| S tp ⊆ S ⊆ S tp .
Since, in addition P δ (∂ t ) = 0 and thus P δ (S tp ) = P δ (S tp ) we have
B Extended Neyman-Pearson Lemma
We now show the following Lemma which is connected to the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [51] from statistical hypothesis testing. We refer the reader to [36] for a proof of this result. 
Lemma B.5 (Extended Neyman-Pearson
E ε (f (ε)) ≥ M · P ε (S) ⇒ E δ (f (δ)) ≥ M · P δ (S).(43)
For any measurable set
S ⊆ Z such that S t c ⊆ S ⊆ S t c : E ε (f (ε)) ≤ M · P ε (S) ⇒ E δ (f (δ)) ≤ M · P δ (S).(44)
C Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 (restated). Let ε and δ be Z-valued random variables. Let x test ∈ X , D train ∈ D n a dataset,
and let ζ −1 (p) := inf{t : ζ(t) ≥ p} be its generalized inverse. For t ≥ 0 and p ∈ [0, 1], let
The following proof is similar in nature to the proof for functionals that model evasion attacks and which is provided in [36] . Here, we extend this proof to consider smoothing over general transforms on classifiers which allows to model a broader range of attack scenarios.
Proof. Let t
). For ease of notation let S A := S t A , S B := S t B , S A := S t A and S B := S t B . Note that by Lemma A.1, ζ is right-continuous and hence for any p ∈ [0, 1] we have ζ(ζ −1 (p)) ≥ p. In particular,
Note that by Lemma A.3, P ε (S A ) ≤ p A and P ε (S B ) ≤ 1 − p B . Hence S A = ∅ and S B = ∅. Let S A ∈ S A and S B ∈ S B arbitrary. Then, since by assumption g ε h is (p A , p B )-confident at (x test , D n ), for any c = c A we have
and
Note that S A ⊆ S A ⊆ S A . We can thus apply part 1 of Lemma B.5 to the function z → F(h)(x test , D train , z) c A and M = 1 and obtain
Similarly, S 
Since the choice of S A and S B was arbitrary, we get
Since the above inequalities hold for all c = c A , we find
which proves the Theorem.
Proposition 1 (restated). If the support of δ is disjoint from the support of ε, then δ can not satisfy (12) .
Proof. Let S δ := {z ∈ Z| µ δ (z) = 0} and S ε := {z ∈ Z| µ ε (z) = 0} denote the support of δ and ε respectively and let N δ := Z \ S δ and N ε := Z \ S ε be their complement in Z. Suppose that S δ S ε = ∅. Note that in this case, for any t ∈ [0, ∞) we have that µ δ (z) µε(z) ≤ t is satisfied if and only if z ∈ S ε ∪ (S δ ∪ S ε ) c and hence S t ≡ S ε ∪ (S δ ∪ S ε ) c = N δ . Since S ε ⊆ N δ we have ζ(t) = P ε (S t ) ≥ P ε (S ε ) = 1 and thus ζ(t) ≡ 1. Hence ∀ p : ζ −1 (p) = inf{t : ζ(t) ≥ p} = 0 and ζ −1 ≡ 0. Since S 0 = ∅ and S 0 = N δ we get that ∀ p : ξ(ζ −1 (p), p) = sup{P δ (S)|S ⊆ N δ ∧ P ε (S) ≤ p} = 0. And thus for any p A and p B the strict inequality
can never be satisfied.
D Tightness
Proof. Fix some arbitrary c B = c A and let t A := ζ −1 (p A ) and t B := ζ −1 (1 − p B ). Note that, since ζ is strictly increasing, continuous and ζ(0) = 0, we have ζ(ζ −1 (p)) = p for any p and thus P ε (S ζ −1 (p) ) = ζ(ζ −1 (p)) = p.
For p ∈ [0, 1] let t p := ζ −1 (p). Then
and in particular
Let A := S t A and B := S t B . It follows from the assumption that
We will now construct a classifier h * such that g ε h * is (p A , p B )-confident at (x test , D train ) and
For that purpose, let Ψ 0 (z) := (φ(x test , z), ψ(D train , z)) ∈ X × D n and consider the equivalence relation
Let τ : Z/ ∼→ Z be the function which maps each equivalence class to its canonical representative. Denote by Im(Ψ 0 ) the image of Ψ 0 and consider the map
Note thatΨ 0 is bijective and thus has an inverseΨ −1 0 : Im(Ψ 0 ) → Z/ ∼. Let Π 0 denote a projection from X × D n into Im(Ψ 0 ). 3 For x ∈ X , let h * be the function defined by
In order to show that h * ∈ H(X × D n , S C ), we need to ensure that c h * (x|D) c = 1. This follows if we show that A ∩ B c = ∅. Suppose by contradiction that ∃ : z ∈ A ∩ B c and let t z := µ δ (z) /µε(z). Then, since ζ is non-decreasing and ζ(ζ −1 (p)) = p
and thus
which is a contradiction. Hence A ∩ B c = ∅ and h * is indeed a classifier. Note that for any z ∈ Z, we have (Ψ −1 0 • Ψ 0 )(z) = [z] and thus, for any S ⊆ Z and z ∈ Z
Finally, this yields
Similarly, we find
Finally, since c B was arbitrary, the ε- 
Note that E ( ε i , m δ − m ε A ) = m ε , m δ − m ε A and let
denote the variance of ε i , m δ − m ε A . Then, since ε i are iid, we get
We can thus write ζ as Φ(a · log(t) + b) for constants a and b. Since this is a concatenation of continuous functions, ζ itself is also continuous on R >0 . In addition, ζ is strictly increasing and lim t→0 ζ(t) = 0. The proposition thus follows from Theorem 2.
E Proofs for Certifying Backdoor Attacks
In this section, we provide proofs for the Corollaries needed to certify robustness against backdoor attacks.
Corollary 1 (restated). Let Z = n i=1 R d and consider the dataset transform ψ : D n × Z → D n defined by
Let ρ : Z → X be any deterministic function and let F be the smoothing functional defined by
Let {Z i } n i=1 be a collection of n iid random variables, Z := (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) and consider the (π + Z)-smoothed classifier given by g π+Z h * (x| D)) = E (h * (x + ρ(π + Z)| ψ(D, π + Z))) .
Let π 0 ∈ R d and suppose that g π+Z
Proof. Let ε := π + Z and δ := Z. Then, for any
Thus, since by assumption g π+Z h * is (p A , p B )-confident at (x test + π 0 ,D train ), applying Theorem 1 to the random variables ε and δ and the smoothing functional F : H(X × D n , S C ) → H(X × D n × Z, S C ) given by F(h)(x, D, z) := h(x + ρ(z)| ψ(D, z)) yields
if condition (12) is satisfied, completing the proof.
Corollary 2 (restated). Consider the setting in Corollary 1. Suppose that
Proof. Let ε := π + Z and δ := Z. Since the classifier g π+Z h * is (p A , p B )-confident at (x test + π 0 ,D train ), By Corollary 1, the proof is complete when we show that (12) reduces to (95). For that purpose, let A := diag(σ −2 , . . . , σ −2 ) ∈ R d×d and consider the bilinear form z 1 , z 2 A := z T 1 Az 2 for z 1 , z 2 ∈ R d . Note that for
We compute ζ as
Since ζ is strictly increasing and continuous on R ≥0 we compute its inverse ∀ p ∈ [0, 1], t ≥ 0 as
Note that the sets ∂ t := S t \ S t have measure 0 under P ε and P δ . Thus, by Lemma A.4, for any p ∈ [0, 1], ξ evaluated at (t p , p) := (ζ −1 (p), p) has the form
Thus, computing ξ at (ζ −1 (1 − p B ), 1 − p B ) yields
Similarly, computing ξ at (ζ −1 (p A ), p A ) yields
Finally, condition (12) is satisfied if and only if n j=1 π i , π i A + Φ −1 (p B ) < Φ −1 (p A ) − n j=1 π i , π i A .
Since ∀ i : π i , π i A = σ −2 π i 2 2 , this is equivalent to
concluding the proof. is (p A , p B )-confident at (x test + π 0 ,D train ), and π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) satisfies
Proof. Let ε := π + Z and δ := Z. Since the classifier g π+Z h * is (p A , p B )-confident at (x test + π 0 ,D train ), By Corollary 1, the proof is complete when we show that (12) reduces to (108). For that purpose, let I εi := (113) Note that
where (x) + = max{x, 0}. We then compute ζ for t ≥ 0
= p 0 t < 1, 1 t ≥ 1.
Recall that ζ −1 (p) := inf{t | ζ(t) ≥ p} for p ∈ [0, 1] and hence ζ −1 (p) = 0 p ≤ p 0 , 1 p > p 0 .
In order to evaluate ξ, we need to compute the lower and strict lower level sets at t = ζ −1 (p). Recall that S t = {z ∈ Z | µ δ (z) µε(z) < t} and S t = {z ∈ Z | µ δ (z) µε(z) ≤ t} and consider 
We can write any S ∈ S p as the disjoint union S = S 0∪ S 1 for some S 1 ⊆ I ε ∩ I δ such that P ε (S 0∪ S 1 ) ≤ p. Note that P δ (S 0 ) = 0 and for any z ∈ S 1 , we have µ ε (z) = µ δ (z). Hence 
Finally, condition (12) is satisfied whenever π satisfies
which is equivalent to
Corollary 4 (restated). Consider the setting in Corollary 3. Let π 0 ∈ R d be a backdoor pattern and suppose that π contains π 0 exactly r times and the 0-vector n − r times. Then, condition (27) is satisfied, if π 0 satisfies
Proof. Note that, if π 0 ∞ > b − a, then π + Z and Z have disjoint support and (27) cannot be satisfied by Proposition 1. Hence, without loss of generality, assume that π 0 ∞ ≤ b − a. Since π contains π 0 exactly r times and is 0 otherwise, we find
Note that ∀ i : |π 0,i | ≤ π 0 ∞ and hence
Finally, algebra shows that
is equivalent to
concluding the proof. Proof. Recall that i (x test , D train ) denotes the index of the training instance in D train most similar to x test , i.e. i (x test , D train ) = arg min i=1,...,n s L (x i , x test ) where s L is the quantized euclidean distance. We write y(i) = y i to denote the class of a given training instance x i ∈ D train . The (π + Z)-smoothed classifier g π+Z h1 smoothed with the functional (133) is then given by g π+Z h1 (x test | D train ) c = E (h(x test | ψ(D train , π + Z)) = P Z (y(i (x test , ψ(D train , π + Z))) = c)
where ψ(D train , π + Z) = {(x i + π i + Z i , y i )| (x i , y i ) ∈ D train }. For ease of notation, let s i := s L (x i + π + Z i , x test ) and abbreviate i (Z) := i (x test , ψ(D train , π + Z). Note that for any class c 
Let p il = P Z (s i = β l ) and note that
Since Z ij are iid Gaussians with mean 0 and variance σ 2 , the sum in (138) scaled by σ 2 follows a non-central χ 2 -distribution with non-centrality parameter λ i := x i + π i − x test 2 2 and d degrees of freedom. Denote the CDF by F d, λi . Then
Computing the conditional probabilities in (137) yields 
